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THE SUPREME COURT-OCTOBER 1959 TERM 
Bernard Schwartz* 
ACOUNTRY's constitutional law is but a reflection of its political, economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external 
conditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects 
in the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law. 
This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries. From 
this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the American 
Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the different stages 
through which American history has passed. 'Our jurisprudence is 
distinctive,' said Justice Jackson on the 150th anniversary of the 
Supreme Court, 'in that every great movement in American history 
has produced a leading case in this court.' "1 
With these words, the present 1-vriter began an article explain-
ing recent developments in our constitutional law to a British 
audience. To one familiar with the work of the nation's highest 
Court, the statement quoted is almost a truism. Any commentary 
on a Supreme Court term is also a commentary on the life of the 
nation in the period covered. 
During our generation, this country has gone through succes-
sive stages of both internal and external stress. Disastrous economic 
depression, world conflict, a period of cold war-these have fur-
nished the constant crises with which government in our day has 
had to cope. Inevitably, these crises have all had their impact 
upon the constitutional law dispensed by the Supreme Court. 
The constitutional decisions of the 1959 Term, like those of 
preceding terms, mirrored the events of the period during which 
the term took place. A nationwide strike in a basic industry brought 
forth a decision on the congressional provision intended to deal with 
such stoppages.2 Strains in our federalism gave rise to holdings on 
the interplay of state and federal power.3 Our position as an over-
seas power was reflected in decisions on military jurisdiction beyond 
our borders.4 The struggle to vindicate civil rights had continuing 
judicial impact in a series of important cases.5 
• Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed. 
I Schwartz, Recent Developments in American Constitutional Law, in PRESENT TRENDS 
IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 155 Gunz ed. 1960). 
2 Part II infra. 
s Parts V and VI infra. 
4 Part III infra. 
5 Part IV infra. 
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During the past term, the high bench remained a storm center 
in our governmental structure. An observer of the Court cannot, 
however, but note with satisfaction that the controversy about the 
Court has greatly diminished in intensity. In part, as in the 1958 
Term, this has been due to the Court itself, which has been remold-
ing its jurisprudence to meet much of the criticism directed against 
it. But, even more so, this quieting of controversy has reflected the 
acceptance among the vast majority of our people of the need for 
the performance by the Court of its constitutional role. With 
Justice Story over a century ago, most Americans would still say, 
"The universal sense of America has decided, that in the last resort 
the judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of the acts 
and laws of the general and state governments, so far as they are 
capable of being made the subject of judicial controversy."6 The 
most significant thing about the Supreme Court is, after all, the 
continued performance by it of its constitutional function and the 
continued acceptance by the mass of Americans of such perform-
ance. This remains the basic aspect of our system-as significant 
in an analysis of recent developments as it would be in an over-all 
historical account. 
I. "A.LL STATES .ARE EQUAL" 
Delivering the judgment in the now-classic equity case of Penn 
v. Lord Baltimore,7 Lord Hardwicke, L.C., declared that the case 
was "of a nature worthy the judicature of a Roman senate rather 
than of a ... judge: and my consolation is, that if I should err in 
my judgment, there is a judicature equal in dignity to a Roman 
senate, that will correct it."8 What Lord Hardwicke said about 
the nature of Penn v. Lord Baltimore might be said with equal 
propriety about United States v. Louisiana9-though, in this coun-
try of course the members of the supreme tribunal can hardly con-
sole themselves with the thought about a higher corrective juris-
diction articulated by his Lordship. 
The Louisiana case was an original action brought by the 
United States against the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas, for a declaration that the United States was 
entitled to exclusive possession of, and full dominion and power 
over, the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the waters 
o 3 STORY, Co.-.n.lENTARIFS ON THE CoNsrrrurION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1570 (1833). 
71 Vesey Sen. 444, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch. 1750). 
8 Id. at 446, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1134. 
9 363 U.S. 1 (1960). 
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of the Gulf of Mexico more than three geographic miles seaward 
from the coast of each defendant state and extending to the edge 
of Continental Shelf. The case itself was the most recent phase of 
the over twenty years' dispute between the coastal states and the 
federal government over their respective rights to exploit the oil 
and other natural resources of offshore submerged lands. In the 
earlier case of United States v. California10 the high Court had 
held that, as against California, the United States possessed para-
mount rights in such lands underlying the Pacific Ocean seaward 
of the low-water mark on the coast of California and outside of 
inland waters. Similar holdings were made in later cases against 
several of the Gulf states.11 
After these decisions Congress passed the Submerged Lands 
Act.12 By it the United States relinquished to all coastal states the 
lands and resources under navigable waters extending three geo-
graphical miles seaward from their coastlines. In addition, the 
five Gulf states were granted the submerged lands as far out as each 
state's boundary line either "existed at the time such State became 
a member of the Union," or had been previously "approved by 
Congress." But in no event was any state to have "more than three 
marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico." 
The Louisiana case essentially involved the application of this 
statutory provision to the five Gulf states. Each of those states 
claimed a three-league boundary and grant. The Supreme Court 
denied such claim as to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, but 
held in favor of Texas and Florida. When Texas was an inde-
pendent republic, it had asserted a three-league maritime bound-
ary. This claim, the Court held, was recognized by the Congress 
both when Texas was admitted to the Union and when it was re-
admitted after the Civil War. Hence the Texas claim came within 
the Submerged Lands Act. Florida's constitution when it was 
readmitted to the Union following the Civil War contained a 
provision which described her Gulf boundary as extending three 
leagues. By readmitting Florida, Congress was held to have "ap-
proved" her three-league boundary within the meaning of the 
Submerged Lands Act. The Court, in other words, concluded 
that Texas and Florida had adequately proved the past existence 
of three-league boundaries recognized by the Congress, while the 
other three Gulf states had not. 
10 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
11 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 
(1950). 
12 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958). 
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The difficulty of the problem presented to the Court by the 
Submerged Lands Act should be recognized first of all. The 
earlier decisions with regard to the offshore-oil lands met strong 
opposition in the political branches of the Government. The 
Eisenhower Administration requested Congress to state specifically, 
in proposed legislation, what rights in addition to those allowed 
by the Court the Gulf states were to possess. Congress was, how-
ever, too torn by conflicting political pressures to make the decision 
itself. Instead, it left the decision to the Supreme Court. The 
Solicitor General stated during argument, "It was a difficult politi-
cal question, and Congress didn't want to have to choose one alterna-
tive or the other." To which remark, Justice Frankfurter inter-
posed, "What's the Supreme Court for except to bail them out?"13 
A statute passed to enable the high Court to "bail" the Con-
gress out will rarely be easy for the Justices to apply. Hence, it 
may be somewhat unfair for a critique to be directed against their 
application of such law. If, indeed, the only doubts to be ex-
pressed were on comparatively minor matters of statutory inter-
pretation, 14 it might well be sounder to remain silent. But the 
Louisiana application of the Submerged Lands Act is based upon 
a view of the status of the states that does violence to the funda-
mental conception upon which the American Union is grounded. 
In commenting to the press on the Louisiana case, a congress-
man from one of the losing states declared, "A state is in the Union 
or it is not in the Union. They should all be treated alike-or 
is that asking too much of the Supreme Court?"15 This comment 
strikes at the basic weakness of the Louisiana decision. It is not an 
answer to say that the test used by the Court is that chosen by the 
Congress, which imposed on the Court the duty of treating the 
states unequally. For overhanging both the Louisiana decision 
and the Submerged Lands Act itself is the question whether such 
inequality among the states is consistent with the theory upon 
which our federation rests. 
Although the Constitution may not expressly so provide, it has 
always been basic that equality is the dominant theme of the Union. 
·when once admitted, a new state stands upon an equal footing ·with 
all existing states, in all respects.16 "Equality of constitutional 
18 N.Y. Times, June 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 3. 
14 E.g., whether the Court is correct in interpreting admission claims to include 
"readmission" claims. 
l5N.Y. Times, June 2, 1960, p. 25, col. 2. 
16 This principle even antedates the Constitution, for it was first stated in the North-
west Ordinance of 1787, LAWS OF THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST 66 (1833). 
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right and power is the condition of all the States of the Union, old 
and new."17 So strong has this principle been that the Court has 
consistently held invalid preadmission requirements imposed by 
the Congress upon new states, as conditions precedent to congres-
sional consent to admission.18 
The clear result of the Louisiana decision, on the other hand, 
is inequality of treatment for the states concerned. Texas may 
well have had the right to assert rights beyond the three-mile limit 
when it was an independent nation. However, by entering the 
Union Texas surrendered the right to claim more than her sister 
states. "If it were necessary for Texas to surrender all her property 
and political rights in the marginal sea in order to enter the Union 
on an 'equal footing' with the other States, pray how can she get 
back some of those rights and still remain on an 'equal footing' 
with the other States?"19 Nor is it an answer to say, as the Court 
does, that it is up to the Congress to dispose of federal property as 
it sees fit.2° Congressional' authority in this respect should not in-
clude the power to perpetuate or permit inequalities among the 
states. 
In Justice Douglas' words, "Our Union is one of equal sover-
eigns, none entitled to preferment denied the others. That is 
what the 'equal footing' standard means or it means nothing.''21 
Under the Louisiana decision, indeed, may we not convert the 
"equal footing" standard into Orwellian terms: All states are 
equal; but some states are more equal than others. 
JI. JUDICIAL POWER AND NATIONWIDE STRIKES 
To the foreign observer, the most striking feature of the Ameri-
can constitutional system is the doctrine of judicial supremacy. 
"No feature in the government of the United States," writes Lord 
Bryce, "has awakened so much curiosity in the European mind, 
caused so much discussion, received so much admiration, and been 
more frequently misunderstood, than the duties assigned to the 
Supreme Court and the functions which it discharges in guarding 
the ark of the Constitution."22 Under the doctrine of judicial 
supremacy, it has been the highest Court that has determined con-
flicts between acts of government and the Constitution, and it has 
17 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883). 
18 The leading case is Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (19ll). 
10 Justice Douglas dissenting in Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 283 (1954). 
20 363 U.S. 1, 7, citing Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954). 
21 Supra note 19, at 283. 
22 1 BRYCE, THE AMERICAN CO!',lMONWEALTH 242 (1913 ed.). 
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done so through the technical forms of the lawsuit. Struggles over 
power that in Europe call forth regiments of troops, in this country 
call forth battalions of lawyers.23 
In the Louisiana case, the high bench resolved a dispute be-
tween conflicting sovereignties comparable to those ordinarily 
within the competence of international tribunals rather than ordi-
nary courts of law. In United Steelworkers v. United States,24 on 
the other hand, the Court was called upon to intervene in a nation-
wide strike in the steel industry. 
The Steelworkers case arose from an action by the Attorney 
General for an injunction against the continuation of an industry-
wide strike of workers in the steel industry. The President, after 
finding that the strike, if allowed to continue, would imperil the 
national health and safety, created a Board of Inquiry, under the 
relevant sections of the Taft-Hartley Act.25 After the Board had 
proved unable to resolve the dispute, the President, reiterating his 
former pronouncement that the continuance of the strike con-
stituted a threat to the national health and safety, ordered the 
Attorney General to seek an injunction. The action was-brought 
under a Taft-Hartley Act provision26 vesting the district court with 
jurisdiction to enjoin a strike if it finds that the strike affects an 
entire industry or a substantial part thereof and, if permitted to 
occur or continue, will imperil the national health or safety. The 
district court in the instant case made the necessary findings and 
issued the injunction. 
The most significant question presented in the Steelworkers 
case arises directly out of the doctrine of judicial supremacy. A 
Court accoutered with the constitutional authority vested in our 
highest tribunal, which, at the same time, is endowed with neither 
the sword nor the purse wielded by the political branches, must 
move warily in exercising power. Above all must it be vigilant 
to ensure that it remains within the limits traditionally associated 
with judicial power, lest it otherwise appear to usurp the power 
to intervene directly in political controversies. It should not be 
forgotten that the Framers deliberately withheld from the high 
Court power that was purely political in form, such as a forthright 
power to veto or revise legislation. Instead, they delegated to the 
Court "the judicial power" alone-a power which, by the express 
23 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY XI (1941). 
24 361 U.S. 39 (1959). 
25 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1958). 
26 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1958). 
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language of Article III, extends only to the resolution of "Cases" 
and "Controversies." 
The result of the constitutional restriction is that the Supreme 
Court's only power is to decide lawsuits between opposing litigants 
with real interests at stake, and its only method of proceeding is by 
the conventional judicial process. As Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan stated, concurring in the Steelworkers case, "Judicial power 
could come into play only in matters such as were the traditional 
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways 
that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Con-
troversies.' "27 
Petitioner union in Steelworkers had contended that the grant 
to the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin strikes such as the steel 
stoppage was not a grant of "judicial power" within the meaning 
of Article III and was therefore beyond the power of the Congress 
to confer. This contention was rejected by the Court. 
Although the Court's reasoning was articulated only in a brief 
per curiam opinion, its conclusion on the point under discussion 
appears sound. Petitioner's contention was, in effect, based upon 
the claim that the Taft-Hartley Act made the courts more or less 
administrative adjuncts of the President for the purpose of acting 
against nationwide strikes. If that were the situation, with the 
judiciary acting, in Justice Douglas' phrase, only as a "rubber 
stamp for the President" or "as the President's Administrative 
Assistant,"28 Article III would clearly be violated. "If the federal 
court is to be merely an automaton stamping the papers an At-
torney General presents, the judicial function rises to no higher 
level than an IBM machine.''29 However, the district court in the 
instant case was not functioning as an automaton. Under the 
Taft-Hartley Act, the court, not the President, fashions the decree. 
Furthermore, the statute imposes upon the court the duty of find-
ing, on its own judgment, whether the strike meets the statutory 
conditions of breadth of involvement and peril to the national 
health or safety. The availability of judicial relief under Taft-
Hartley thus depends upon judicially-made findings of fact. Of 
the matters decided by the courts, there is no review by other gov-
ernmental agencies. 
Far from being foreign to the ordinary type of "judicial power," 
the authority vested in the courts to issue a Taft-Hartley "eighty-
21 361 U.S. 39, 60 (1959). 
28Jd. at 71. 
20 Ibid. 
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day injunction" appears but to be a modern equivalent of the 
traditional power of the courts to abate public nuisances. The 
power to enjoin public nuisances at the suit of the Government has 
been a commonplace of judicial jurisdiction in the Anglo-American 
world. The criteria for judicial action under Taft-Hartley-peril 
to health or safety-are similar to those on which courts have cus-
tomarily acted in public nuisance cases. "There can therefore be 
no doubt that, being thus akin to jurisdiction long historically 
exercised, the function to be performed by the District Courts 
under § 208 (a) is within the 'judicial Power' as contemplated by 
Art. III, § 2, and is one which Congress may thus confer upon the 
courts."30 
One can indeed, go further and wonder whether, absent the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act,31 the federal courts could not grant an 
injunction against a nationwide strike in an essential industry 
under their traditional equity powers, even without the Taft-
Hartley Act. In the well-known Debs case,32 an injunction was 
issued against the 1894 Pullman strike partially upon the ground 
that the Government might invoke judicial power to abate what 
was in effect a nuisance detrimental to the public interest; the strike 
in question resulted in interference with the mail and interruption 
of interstate commerce. Under the Debs approach, there appears 
to be adequate legal warrant for action by the Government against 
a nationwide strike like that in the Steelworkers case, even with-
out express statutory authorization. A fortiori, if Congress ex-
pressly authorizes an injunction in such cases, there should be 
no legal question of judicial power when such decree is actually 
issued. 
III. MILITARY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A problem that has grown in importance in an era dominated 
by war and cold war is that of the relationship between military 
law and the Constitution. Since the last war this problem has 
taken on a new dimension due to the presence of American forces 
in different countries for purposes of military occupation and to 
fulfill our defensive commitments to our overseas allies. Of 
course, those actually serving in the armed forces, whether at home 
30 Id. at 61-62 (concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan). 
31 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 
(1958), does not affect this, since, under United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 
258 (1947), that statute is not applicable in an action brought by the Government. 
32 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
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or abroad, are clearly subject to military law and the provisions of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.33 A difficulty arises, how-
ever, with regard to those who may accompany members of the 
armed forces abroad. May such persons, consistently with the 
Constitution, be subjected to the jurisdiction of military tribunals? 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice itself contains a provi-
sion34 under which all persons accompanying the armed forces out-
side the continental limits of the United States are made subject to 
the Code; this means, as a practical matter, that they are subject to 
court-martial jurisdiction. In the 1957 Term, in Reid v. Covert,35 
the Supreme Court held this provision unconstitutional when ap-
plied to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses. But 
Covert left open more questions than it answered. Under it, a 
civilian dependent of an American serviceman abroad may not 
constitutionally be tried for a capital offense by other than an 
Article III court. Is the same true where such dependent is 
charged with an offense less than capital? And what of civilian 
employees of the armed forces abroad? 
These questions were answered in three cases decided during 
the past term. The first of them, Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton,36 dealt with the question specifically raised, though not 
answered, in Reid v. Covert-whether a civilian dependent abroad 
could be tried by court-martial for a noncapital offense. The 
Covert Court split evenly on this point.37 In the Singleton case, 
on the other hand, a clear majority of the Court ruled that the 
Covert holding did extend to noncapital offenses.38 Hence, a 
civilian dependent could not be subjected to court-martial jurisdic-
tion in any case in time of peace, whether such case be capital or 
noncapital in character. 
The opinion of the Court in Singleton was delivered by Justice 
Clark, who had dissented in Covert. This is not as inconsistent as 
it may at first glance appear, for, in his Covert dissent, Justice 
Clark had been emphatic in declaring that there was nowhere in 
the Constitution any basis for distinguishing between capital and 
noncapital offenses, so far as court-martial jurisdiction over 
33 70A Stat. !16 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1958). 
lH 64 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 552 (11) [now 10 U.S.C. § 802 (11)]. 
85 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
86 361 U .s. 234 (1960). 
37 Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren stated that a court-
martial may not be used for a noncapital offense; Justices Clark, Burton, Frankfurter, and 
Harlan took the opposite approach. Justice Whittaker did not participate in the decision. 
88 Only Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented from this ruling. 
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civilians was concemed.39 Thus, unless the Covert decision were 
to be overruled, its holding had to apply to all conduct proscribed 
by the Uniform Code, whether capital or noncapital in nature. 
The principal question, as Justice Whittaker pointed out in a 
concurring opinion, is one of the status of the person accused. In 
his words, "courts-martial either do or do not have jurisdiction 
and, hence, power to try the accused for all offenses against the 
military law or for none at all."40 Since, under Covert, Congress 
may not constitutionally provide for court-martial trial of civilian 
dependents in capital cases, neither can it do so in noncapital 
c:ases.41 
In Grisham v. Hagan42 and McElroy v. United States ex rel. 
Guagliardo,43 decided the same day as Singleton, the majority of 
the Court held that court-martial jurisdiction could not constitu-
tionally extend to civilians employed overseas by the military 
services. Grisham involved a capital offense; Guagliardo, a non-
capital one. 
Grisham is based directly upon the Covert reasoning. Under 
Covert, said Justice Clark, the death penalty is so drastic "that a 
dependent charged with a capital crime must have the benefit of 
a jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no less impact 
when applied to civilian employees.''44 But, if that is true, then 
the Singleton rationale requires the same result in civilian em-
ployee noncapital cases. Hence Guagliardo holds that, like the 
civilian dependent, the civilian employee overseas is wholly exempt 
from military jurisdiction. 
Justice Whittaker, in his dissent to these two cases, urged that 
the Covert case was limited to "civilian dependents." In his view, 
there was a marked and clear difference between such dependents 
and American civilians employed by the armed forces at military 
posts in foreign lands. The latter perform essential services for 
the military and, -therefore, should be subject to the same rules of 
military justice as the "members" of the armed forces. 
It must be admitted that the Court's decisions in Singleton, 
Grisham, and Guagliardo pose serious practical problems. It is 
now most difficult for Congress to frame a workable scheme for 
subjecting civilians living and working on American bases abroad 
39 354 U.S. 1, 89 (1957). 
40 361 U.S. 234, 263 (1960). 
41 Id. at 248. 
42 361 U.S. 278 (1960). 
43 36J U.S. 281 (1960). 
44 Supra note 42, at 280. 
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to necessary and proper rules governing their conduct. The various 
alternatives which may be possible45 appear to be all but unwork-
able. Perhaps the only reasonable alternative is to subject our 
civilian dependents and employees to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the countries in which the bases on which they live and work are 
located-a solution which is both workable and in accord with 
international law, even though it will hardly seem satisfactory to 
many Americans. 
At the same time, to the constitutional observer, Singleton, 
Grisham, and Guagliardo will take their place in the line of cases 
starting ·with Ex parte Milligan,46 which stand as constant reaffirma-
tions of the basic separation of the military from the civil. Indeed, 
in Covert the Court asserted, "A statute cannot be framed by which 
a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdic-
tion in time of peace."41 Certainly, that is the import of the cases 
which have been discussed. Under our Constitution, courts of 
law alone are given power to try civilians.48 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
In few areas has the work of the highest tribunal in recent years 
been more consequential than in that of applying the equal pro-
tection clause. And in few respects has the Supreme Court of the 
past twenty years differed more from its predecessors than in its 
readiness to give full effect to the constitutional guaranty of equal 
protection of the laws for the Negro. 
Before 1957, the function of ensuring that equal protection 
would become more than a mere political slogan was almost en-
tirely assumed by the judicial branch of the Government. In that 
year Congress, for the first time in almost a century, assumed a posi-
tive role in this field by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1957.49 
Like all other legislation, however, the civil rights statute is not a 
self-executing document. The ought laid down in 1957 must run 
the gantlet of judicial interpretation before it attains the practical 
status of an is. Are not Chief Justice Hughes' celebrated words, 
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the 
411 Some of them are discussed by Justice Clark dissenting in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
87-89 (1957). 
46 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
47 354 U.S. 1, !15 (1957), quoting WINTHROP, Mn.rr.ARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 107 (2d ed. 
1920) (Winthrop's italics). 
48 Compare id. at 40. 
40 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1958). 
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judges say it is," true as well with regard to legislation? Any statute, 
in actual practice, is what the judges say it is. 
During the past term, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 began its 
inevitable course through the gantlet of Supreme Court construc-
tion. Nor can it be gainsaid that the decisions rendered thus far 
have been of basic importance to implementation of the statute. 
The law itself, it can hardly be denied, was a watered-do,vn com-
promise. If its terms were to be read by the high bench in a 
decimating spirit, it would surely lose all practical efficacy. 
In this past term, however, the Supreme Court has clearly indi-
cated that it will construe that statute with a benevolent eye in 
order to give it the full remedial effect that Congress intended. 
In United States v. Raines/'0 the United States brought an action 
against the members of the Board of Registrars and certain Deputy 
Registrars of Terrell County, Georgia. The complaint, seeking an 
injunction and other relief, charged that the defendants had, 
through various devices in the administration of their offices, dis-
criminated on racial grounds against Negroes who desired to reg-
ister to vote in elections conducted in the state. The district court 
dismissed the complaint, holding the relevant subsection of the 
1957 statute unconstitutional. According to the district court the 
statutory language allowed the United States to enjoin purely pri-
vate action designed to deprive citizens of the right to vote on 
account of their race or color. Although the complaint in question 
involved only official action, the court ruled that since, in its opin-
ion, the statute on its face was susceptible of application beyond the 
scope permissible under the fifteenth amendment, it was to be 
considered unconstitutional in all its applications. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that since the instant 
case plainly involved a proceeding against official action within the 
meaning of the fifteenth amendment, the lower court had erred in 
ruling the statute invalid because of its possible scope in hypo-
thetical cases not presented. As Justice Brennan stated, "[W]hat-
ever precisely may be the reach of the fifteenth amendment, it is 
enough to say that the conduct charged ... is certainly, as 'state 
action' and the clearest form of it, subject to the ban of that amend-
ment, and that legislation designed to deal with such discrimina-
tion is 'appropriate legislation' under it."51 Because the complaint 
here called for a clearly constitutional application of the statute, 
that should have ended the question of constitutionality in this case. 
50 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
51Jd. at 25. 
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Appellees in the Raines case went farther and urged that it 
was beyond the power of Congress to authorize the Government to 
bring an action in support of private constitutional rights. This 
contention, which went to the heart of congressional power to im-
plement the post-bellum amendments, was also rejected by the 
Court. Said Justice Brennan, "[T]here is the highest public inter-
est in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, in-
cluding those that bear the most directly on private rights, and we 
think it perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the United 
States to be the guardian of that public interest in a suit for in-
junctive relief."02 Certainly, if, as already seen in our discussion 
of the Steelworkers case,53 Congress can empower the Government 
to seek injunctions against nationwide strikes, it should be able 
to authorize the Government to seek decrees against violations of 
constitutional voting rights-particularly where the relevant con-
stitutional provision expressly empowers Congress to enforce it by 
appropriate legislation.54 
While the Raines case dealt with a challenge to the validity of 
the Civil Rights Act itself, Hannah v. Larche,55 on the other hand, 
involved a challenge to the functioning of the Civil Rights Com-
mission, an agency of the executive branch of the Government 
set up under the 1957 statute. It concerned the validity of certain 
rules of procedure adopted by the Commission. The case arose 
out of the Commission's investigation of alleged Negro voting 
deprivations in Louisiana. The appellees, registrars of voters in 
Louisiana, having been summoned to appear before a hearing 
which the Commission proposed to conduct in Shreveport, Louisi-
ana, petitioned the federal district court to enjoin the Commission 
from holding its anticipated hearing. It was alleged, among other 
things, that the Commission's rules of procedure governing the 
conduct of its investigations were unconstitutional. The specific 
rules challenged provided that the identity of persons submitting 
complaints to the Commission need not be disclosed, and that those 
summoned to testify before the Commission, including persons 
against whom complaints had been filed, might not cross-examine 
other witnesses called by the Commission. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged procedural rules 
were consistent with due process. This was true, said the Court, 
ll2Id. at 27. 
ll3 Note 24 supra. 
M See also United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960). 
511363 U.S. 420 (1960). 
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because of the nature of the functions vested in the Civil Rights 
Commission. As described by Chief Justice Warren, "[I]ts func-
tion is purely investigative and fact-finding. It does not adjudicate. 
It does not hold trials or determine anyone's civil or criminal lia-
bility. It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or 
impose any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations de-
priving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Com-
mission does not and cannot take any affirmative action which ·will 
affect an individual's legal rights. The only purpose of its existence 
is to find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for 
legislative or executive action."56 
Whether due process demands a full adversary hearing depends 
entirely upon the nature of the governmental function involved. 
"[W]hen governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding 
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, 
it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have 
traditionally been associated with the judicial process. On the 
other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an 
adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding investi-
gation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply 
of judicial procedures be used."57 Since the rights claimed by 
appellees are those normally associated only with adjudicatory 
proceedings, and since the Civil Rights Commission does not ad-
judicate, it need not be bound by adjudicatory procedures. 
One familiar with the practical realities involved in the en-
forcement of voting rights in the South well realizes that any other 
decision than that reached in Hannah v. Larche could render 
wholly ineffective the functioning of the Civil Rights Commission. 
"It is not a constitutional requirement that the Commission be 
argumentatively turned into a forum for trial of the truth of par-
ticular allegations of denial of voting rights in order thereby to 
invalidate its functioning.''58 The functioning of the Civil Rights 
Commission would be stifled if its hearings were transformed into 
trial-like proceedings and if an absolute right were given to cross-
examine every witness called to testify. Nor is it hard to conceive 
what practical consequences would ensue if the identity of persons 
submitting complaints to the Commission had to be disclosed. "We 
would be shutting our eyes to actualities to be unmindful of the 
fact that it would dissuade sources of vitally relevant information 
56 Id. at 441. 
57 Id. at 442. 
58 Id. at 492 (concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). 
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from making that information knO"wn to the Commission, if the 
Commission were required to reveal its sources and subject them 
to cross-examination. "50 
V. COMMERCE AND STATE POWER 
During the 1958 Term, the Court had expanded the permissible 
area of state taxation of commerce. In Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota,60 indeed, the high bench went so 
far in upholding state taxing power that the Congress enacted a 
statute expressly limiting the effect of the Court's decision, as well 
as providing for a general legislative study of the whole subject.61 
In the Northwestern Portland case, the Court had upheld state 
power to levy income taxes upon foreign corporations engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce. This past term, in Scripto, Inc. 
v. Carson,62 the Court dealt with state use taxes. The state power 
to impose such taxes even upon products brought in from other 
states has, of course, been settled since H enneford v. Silas Mason 
Co.63 Henneford, however, left open the vital question of imple-
mentation of state power in this area. The effectiveness of a use 
tax depends upon the scheme by which it is collected. Such taxes 
are all but impossible to collect from the thousands of individuals 
who make purchases across state lines. To overcome these diffi-
culties, the states have attempted to make the sellers collect use 
taxes for them. 
The Scripto case involved such an attempt by the State of 
Florida. By statute, Florida required appellant, a Georgia corpora-
tion, to be responsible for the collection of a use tax on certain 
mechanical ·writing instruments which appellant sold and shipped 
from its place of business in Atlanta to residents of Florida for use 
and enjoyment there. Upon Scripto's failure to collect the tax, 
the appellee comptroller levied a use tax liability against it. Ap-
pellant then brought this suit to test the validity of the imposition, 
contending that the requirement of Florida's statute not only 
placed a burden on interstate commerce, but also violated due 
process. Appellant does not own, lease, or maintain any office, 
distributing house, warehouse or other place of business in Florida, 
or have any regular employee or agent there. Nor does it own or 
50 Id. at 489. 
oo 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
0173 Stat. 555, 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (Supp. I, 1959). 
02 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
oa 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
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maintain any bank account or stock of merchandise in Florida. 
Orders for its products are solicited by advertising specialty brokers 
who are residents of Florida. At the time of suit, there were ten 
such brokers-each having a written contract and a specific territory. 
The Court upheld the power of Florida to collect the use tax 
from appellant on the basis of property bought and shipped from 
its home office to purchasers for use in Florida. For the state to 
exercise such authority over the seller, there must, to use Justice 
Jackson's words from an earlier case, be "some definite link, some 
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or 
transaction it seeks to tax."64 Such a nexus, said the Court, is pres-
ent here. Where such nexus exists, the state can require that the 
out-of-state seller be its tax collector on orders from its residents. 
Scripto greatly weakens the effect of Miller Bros. Co. v. Mary-
land,65 where the Court had limited the power of the state of the 
purchaser to make the out-of-state seller its use tax collector. In 
Scripto, the Court, in effect, limits Miller Bros. to the case of a 
seller who makes no effort to sell his product outside his own out-
of-state store. But any effort by the seller to solicit business or 
otherwise exploit the consumer market in the state of the pur-
chaser provides a sufficient nexus to enable that state to require 
the seller to collect its tax. 
Scripto may be understood as a logical successor of the 1958 
Term decisions upholding state taxing power. But, as a practical 
matter, it goes much further than they in defeating a basic purpose 
of the commerce clause. The Court has upheld use taxes because 
their basic purpose is to create equality as between interstate and 
local commerce. Yet, in this respect, its effect is exactly that of a 
protective tariff. It may be advantageous for the state to be able to 
say to interstate commerce, "You may come into my borders, but 
your products must be subject to the same tax burdens as local 
products." There is no doubt that a sovereign country could make 
such a statement and levy tariffs to carry it into effect. In our 
system, however, the states are barred from laying such tariffs upon 
commerce from sister states. Under the Court's decisions uphold-
ing the use tax, nevertheless, our supposedly free-trade economy 
is now all but honeycombed with this type of "protective tariff." 
Another area of state taxing power that is of great significance 
in a federal system such as ours is that which touches the area of 
64 Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). 
65 347 U.S. 340 (1954). 
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so-called intergovernmental tax immunities. In recent years, the 
high Court has been careful to limit such immunities to the gov-
ernments concerned, and to withdraw the immunities that had 
previously been recognized in private individuals, such as govern-
ment contractors, having dealings with government. The most 
recent of the cases indicating this trend was United States v. De-
troit,66 decided during the 1957 Term, which held valid a local 
tax imposed on a private lessee of federally-owned property. · 
Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School District,67 
decided this term, shows, on the other hand, that, although such 
private lessees no longer are sheltered by the protective umbrella 
of the federal government's tax immunity, they may not be sub-
jected to discriminatory state taxation. The relevant state law in 
Phillips, granting the state and its subdivisions the right to tax the 
lessees of federal lands, was more burdensome than the statute 
granting the right to tax lessees of state lands. So substantial and 
transparent a discrimination against the Government and its les-
sees, said the Court, must fall. Nor is the discriminaton justified 
by the state's power to classify. "Where taxation of the private 
use of the Government's property is concerned, the Government's 
interests must be weighed in the balance. Accordingly, it does 
not seem too much to require that the State treat those who deal 
with the Government as well as it treats those with whom it deals 
itself."68 Though, as already stated, the recent trend is to remove the 
Government's tax immunity from private persons solely because 
they happen to deal 1\Tith the Government, "it still remains true, 
as it has from the time of M'Culloch v. Maryland ... that a state 
tax may not discriminate against the Government or those 1\Tith 
whom it deals."69 
As pointed out last year,70 closely related to the cases involving 
state taxation of commerce are those dealing 1\Tith state regulation 
of commerce. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit71 
is a case close to the line between valid and invalid state action in 
that area. It arose out of the application of certain provisions of 
a municipal smoke abatement code to ships operated in interstate 
commerce. The ships in question were equipped with boiler 
66 355 U.S. 466 (1958). 
67 361 U.S. 376 (1960). 
os Id. at 385. 
60 Id. at 387. (Emphasis added.) 
70 Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1958 Term, 58 MICH. L. REv. 165, 184 (1959). 
71 362 U .s. 440 (1960). 
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stacks emitting smoke which in density and duration exceeded the 
maximum standards allowable under the relevant municipal code. 
Structural alterations would be required in order to insure 
compliance. 
The Court upheld the application of the municipal regulation 
to the interstate ships, in the absence of conflicting federal pre-
scriptions. Such state regulation, "which does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uni-
formity, may constitutionally stand."72 In the instant case, the 
appellant had argued that, in fact, this case was comparable to 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,73 since other local governments 
might impose differing requirements as to air pollution. But, said 
the Court, appellant had pointed to none; the record contained 
nothing to suggest the existence of any such competing or con-
flicting local regulations. 
The implication is that for the Southern Pacific holding to 
apply, it must be shown that there are actually conflicting state 
regulations in existence. One wonders whether this is not to mis-
read both Southern Pacific and the test of Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia74 upon which it was based. 
In Southern Pacific itself, there was no showing that states other 
than Arizona had imposed train-limit requirements. Yet that did 
not deter the Court from ruling that the Arizona law was invalid. 
It was the possibility, not the actuality, of a "crazy-quilt"715 of train-
limit requirements that made a uniform regulatory system essen-
tial. The variety of requirements for equipment which the states 
may prescribe in order to meet their air pollution needs under-
scores the argument that the same considerations should apply in 
a case like Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.76 
VI. CRIMINAL LAW 
In explaining the recent work of the highest Court to the 
English reader, Professor Carr states, "During the last decade the 
Supreme Court has increasingly found itself called upon to review 
criminal judgments .... Indeed, the number of cases of this type 
has increased to a point where the Supreme Court devotes a large 
72 Id. at 448. 
73 325 U .s. 761 (1945). 
74 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851). 
75 The term used by Justice Frankfurter concurring in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 
373, 388 (1946). 
76 Compare Justice Douglas dissenting, 362 U.S. 440,455 (1960). 
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measure of its time and energy functioning as the nation's highest 
court of criminal appeals."77 
In this respect, it should be pointed out that the role of the 
highest tribunal in the criminal field has two aspects. There is, in 
the first place, the Court's function in reviewing convictions ap-
pealed to it from the lower federal courts. In such cases, the high 
bench acts as the direct hierarchical head of the federal judicial 
system; its relation to the lower federal courts is that of chief to 
subordinates. The same is not true in the second area-the review 
of state court convictions. In performing this role, the Supreme 
Court's authority is essentially limited to the enforcement of the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Several cases decided during the past term involve familiar 
exercises of the high bench's function of requiring that state con-
victions meet the standards of due process. In Blackburn v. Ala-
bama,18 a conviction based upon a confession was set aside, where 
the defendant, a Negro who was mentally ill, had confessed during 
an eight-to-nine-hour period of sustained solitary interrogation in 
a tiny room. Such confession, said the Chief Justice, "most prob-
ably was not the product of any meaningful act of volition. "79 
Therefore, its use "transgressed the imperatives of fundamental 
justice which find their expression in the Due Process Clause.''80 
Similarly, in Hudson v. North Carolina,81 the Court reversed 
a conviction for robbery because of a denial of counsel, where the 
defendant was eighteen years old and had only a sixth-grade educa-
tion.82 The Court relied primarily upon the fact that midway 
through the trial a codefendant was permitted to plead guilty in 
the presence of the jury. This was not a case, said the Court, where 
the failure to appoint counsel resulted in a constitutionally unfair 
trial simply because of defendant's comparative youth. But the 
guilty plea of the codefendant left defendant entirely to his own 
devices at a moment of great potential prejudice. A layman alone 
could not be expected to be able to deal with such a situation. 
"The prejudicial position in which the petitioner found himself 
when his codefendant pleaded guilty before the jury raised prob-
77 Carr, Civil Liberties in the United States, in PRESENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL 
GovERNMENT 205 CTunz ed. 1960). 
78 ll61 U.S. 199 (1960). 
70 Id. at 211. 
80 Ibid. 
81 ll6ll U.S. 697 (1960). 
82 Although he was characterized by the trial court as intelligent and familiar with 
criminal trials, id. at 701. 
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lems requiring professional knowledge and experience beyond a 
layman's ken."83 The decision in this respect is but an application 
of the tendency noted last year84 to hold the denial of counsel 
improper in all except the simplest cases. All but such cases may 
be said to raise "problems requiring professional knowledge and 
experience beyond a layman's ken."85 
A more striking case is Thompson v. City of Louisville.86 
Defendant there was convicted in a municipal police court of 
loitering and disorderly conduct. The conviction was based upon 
defendant's presence in a cafe for over half an hour, during which 
time he was "dancing by himself," "shuffling," or "patting his 
feet" in time to the music. A police officer arrested him for loiter• 
ing and then, after he "argued" with the officer, for disorderly 
conduct. He was fined $10 on each charge. 
Since police court fines of less than $20 on a single charge were 
not appealable or otherwise reviewable in any other court of the 
state, defendant sought review directly in the Supreme Court. 
Thus, the highest court of the land acted, in effect, as a direct 
appellate tribunal over a municipal police court in a case involving 
an almost insignificant amount. Yet, it is basic in our system that 
the importance of a case is to be found, not in its monetary impact, 
but in the legal principles involved in it. Justice Black rightly 
states, in his Thompson opinion, "Our examination of the record 
presented in the petition for certiorari convinced us that although 
the fines here are small, the due process questions presented are 
substantial and we therefore granted certiorari to review the police 
court's judgments."87 
On the merits, the Court found that the charges against defend· 
ant were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render his 
conviction unconstitutional under the due process clause. On the 
facts presented, defendant could not validly be convicted either of 
loitering or disorderly conduct. "Decision of ... [the due process] 
question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence, but on 
whether this conviction rests upon any evidence at all."88 There 
could be no conviction for loitering where defendant was acting 
only as he had here. Nor could he be guilty of disorderly conduct 
as Id. at 703-04. 
84 Schwartz, The Supreme Court-October 1958 Term, 58 MICH. L. REv. 165, 195 (1959). 
85 Note 83 supra. 
86 362 U .s. 199 (1960). 
81 Id. at 203. 
BB Id. at 199. 
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only because he had argued with the arresting officer. Thus there 
was no evidence to support the convictions. "Just as 'Conviction 
upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,' so 
is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without 
evidence of his guilt. "89 
Perhaps the most difficult criminal cases which the Supreme 
Court must decide are those involving the interplay of state and 
federal power. The very nature of our federalism makes such 
interaction frequent. During the 1958 Term, Bartkus v. Illinois90 
and Abbate v. United States91 concerned one aspect of the inter-
play between state and federal jurisdiction-that of multiple prose-
cutions for the same offense. During the last term, Elkins v. United 
States92 concerned another important aspect-that of the use of 
evidence in the courts of one jurisdiction which had been secured 
by officers of another. 
Elkins arose out of a federal conviction for intercepting and 
recording telephone communications and divulging such commu-
nications in violation of the Communications Act. Defendants 
made a motion to suppress certain evidence which had originally 
been seized by state law enforcement officers from the home of one 
of the defendants under circumstances which were found by the 
courts of the state to render the search and seizure unlawful. The 
federal trial court denied the motion to suppress; the Supreme 
Court reversed. 
As stated by the Court, the question presented in Elkins was: 
"May articles obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and 
seizure by state officers, without involvement of federal officers, be 
introduced in evidence against a defendant over his timely objec-
tion in a federal criminal trial?"93 To answer this question, a word 
must be said about the prior cases on this subject. 
In Weeks v. United States,94 the Court laid down the basic rule 
which excludes in a federal criminal prosecution evidence obtained 
by federal agents in violation of defendant's fourth amendment 
rights. At the same time, the Weeks decision dealt with articles 
used as evidence in a federal court which had been seized by local 
police officers acting on their own account. The Court held that 
89 Id. at 206. 
90 1159 U .s. 121 (1959). 
911159 U.S. 187 (1959). 
ll2 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
llS Id. at 208. 
94 232 U .s. 383 (1914). 
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the admission of this evidence was not error for "the fourth amend-
ment is not directed to individual misconduct of such [state] offi-
cials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its agen-
cies."95 This second aspect of the Weeks opinion came to be called 
the "silver-platter" doctrine. It had been consistently applied in 
many cases prior to Elkins. 
In Elkins, the Court reexamined the validity of the "silver-
platter" doctrine and rejected it. In the Court's view, the reason-
ing upon which Weeks rested-that the fourth amendment is not 
directed against misconduct of state officials-has not been valid 
since Wolf v. Colorado.96 That case, said the Elkins Court, deter-
mined that the "Federal Constitution, by virtue of the fourteenth 
amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state 
officers."97 Wolf, in this view, removed the doctrinal underpinning 
for the silver-platter doctrine. "The foundation upon which the 
admissibility of state-seized evidence in a federal trial originally 
rested-that unreasonable state searches did not violate the Federal 
Constitution-thus disappeared .... "98 
Elkins consequently rejected the doctrine that freely admitted 
in a federal criminal trial evidence seized by state agents in viola-
tion of the defendant's constitutional rights. In its place, it sub-
stitutes the rule "that evidence obtained by state officers during a 
search which, if conduced by federal officers, would have violated 
the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the fourth amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's 
timely objection in a federal criminal trial."99 
One cannot but sympathize with the Court's feeling in Elkins 
that the federal courts should not "be accomplices in the willful 
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold."100 Nev-
ertheless, one may wonder whether Wolf v. Colorado does destroy 
the doctrinal underpinning of the express limitation of the Weeks 
exclusionary rule to cases of federal violations as clearly as Elkins 
indicates. The Elkins approach assumes that, as a consequence of 
Wolf, precisely the same rules are applicable in determining 
whether the conduct of state officers violates the Constitution as 
are applicable in determining whether the conduct of federal offi-
cers does so. But this ignores the basic distinction between the 
95 Id. at 398. 
96 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
97 Note 92 supra, at 213. 
9Blbid. 
99 Id. at 223. 
100Jbid. 
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specifics of a provision of the Bill of Rights and the generalities of 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf itself, 
despite the Elkins opinion, did not make every technical state 
violation of the fourth amendment so contrary to basic standards 
of justice as to make it automatically a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment. Elkins appears to disregard the essential difference, 
so strongly emphasized only last term in the Bartkus case,1°1 be-
tween the particularities of the first eight amendments and the 
fundamental nature of what constitutes due process.102 
VII. FIRST AMENDMENT CASES 
In the Supreme Court of recent years, one of the sharpest divi-
sions has concerned the scope of the first amendment. More spe-
cifically, are first amendment rights to be treated like other consti-
tutional rights and, as such, subject to legislative restraint in 
appropriate cases? Or, are such rights to occupy a "preferred posi-
tion," with the absolute language of the first amendment given 
literal effect, so that they are subject to no legislative qualification 
whatever? 
During the past term, the division in the Court on this subject 
appears to have continued unabated. The two wings of the high 
bench continued to express their own views on the matter. The 
actual first amendment decisions, however, found both wings in 
agreement in striking down three different state laws. The first of 
these laws was the municipal ordinance at issue in Smith v. Cali-
fornia.103 It made it unlawful "for any person to have in his pos-
session any obscene or indecent ·writing [or] book ... in any place 
of business where ... books ... are sold or kept for sale." The 
offense in Smith was defined by the state courts to consist solely of 
the possession, in appellant's bookstore, of a certain book found 
upon judicial investigation to be obscene. The definition included 
no element of scienter-knowledge by appellant of the contents of 
the book-and thus the ordinance was construed as imposing 
"strict" or "absolute" criminal liability. 
The Supreme Court held that, as so construed, it was in con-
flict with the Federal Constitution. In 1957 Roth v. United 
States104 had, it is true, recognized that obscene speech is not en-
101 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
102 Compare Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 
233 (1960). 
108 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
104 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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titled to first amendment protection. This decision was not, as 
such, altered by Smith. But Smith holds that although "traffic in 
obscene literature may be outlawed as a crime ... one cannot be 
made amenable to such criminal outlawry unless he is chargeable 
with knowledge of the obscenity."105 In Justice Brennan's words, 
"[O]ur holding in Roth does not recognize any state power to 
restrict the dissemination of books which are not obscene; and we 
think this ordinance's strict liability feature would tend seriously 
to have that effect, by penalizing booksellers, even though they 
had not the slightest notice of the character of the books they 
sold."106 
Justice Brennan draws an instructive parallel between the ordi-
nance at issue in Smith and familiar forms of penal statutes which 
dispense with any element of knowledge on the part of the person 
charged. The example given of such a penal statute is the modern 
food and drug law. In such cases, says Justice Brennan, the public 
interest in the purity of its food is so great that defendant's igno-
rance of the character of particular food is irrelevant. "There is 
no specific constitutional inhibition against making the distributors 
of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitu-
tional guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in 
the way of imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller.''107 
Such a requirement would result in a severe limitation "on the 
public's access to constitutionally protected literature. 'For if the 
bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, 
and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the 
books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have 
imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally 
protected as well as obscene literature.' "108 Interestingly enough, 
this intimation that speech occupies a preferred position, compared 
to the right to sell food and drugs, was expressly seconded by Justice 
Frankfurter.109 
In Talley v. California,11° a second municipal ordinance was 
condemned as an invalid restriction of first amendment rights. The 
ordinance in question prohibited the distribution of any handbill 
in any place under any circumstances, unless the handbills had 
105 Note 103 supra, at 161 (characterization of majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter, 
concurring). 
106 Id. at 152. 
101 Id. at 152-53. 
108 Id. at 153. 
109 Id. at 162. 
110 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
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printed on them the names and addresses of the persons who 
prepared, distributed or sponsored them. Petitioner had been 
convicted for violating this ordinance. He had distributed hand-
bills urging a boycott against certain merchants on the ground that, 
as one set of handbills said, they carried products of "manufacturers 
who will not offer equal employment opportunities to Negroes, 
Mexicans, and Orientals." The handbills did not have printed on 
them the information required by the ordinance. 
In the leading case of Lovell v. Griffin,111 the Court held void 
on its face an ordinance that forbade any distribution of literature 
at any time or place without a license. Such ordinance amounted 
to a previous restraint upon publication and distribution of a type 
wholly inconsistent with the notion of freedom of speech. Accord-
ing to the Court, the Talley ordinance falls under the ban of the 
Griffin decision. The identification requirement imposed tends 
to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom 
of expression. "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and 
even books have played an important role in the progress of man-
kind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout 
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws 
either anonymously or not at all."112 "[I]dentification and fear of 
reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public mat-
ters of importance."113 An ordinance which has such effect is, like 
that at issue in Lovell v. Griffin, void on its face. 
Another case illustrating that there are times and circumstances 
when states may not compel members of groups engaged in the 
dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified is Bates v. City of 
Little Rock.114 Petitioners there had been convicted of violating 
an ordinance of an Arkansas municipality by refusing a demand to 
furnish city officials with a list of the names of the members of a 
local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People. The municipality concerned had for some years 
imposed annual license taxes on a broad variety of businesses, oc-
cupations, and professions. In 1957, it added the requirement 
that any organization operating within the municipality must 
supply to the city clerk, upon request, specified information in-
cluding a list of all members and contributors. Petitioners, cus-
todians of the records of the local branch of the NAACP, had 
111303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
112 Note 110 supra, at 64. 
113 Id. at 65. 
114 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
428 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
supplied the municipality with all the information required by 
the ordinance except that which would have required disclosure 
of the names of the organization's members and contributors. 
The Supreme Court held that in the circumstances presented 
the requirement of disclosure constituted an invalid restriction of 
a first amendment right. The first amendment guarantees free-
dom of assembly, which includes the correlative right of freedom 
of association. "Freedoms such as these are protected not only 
against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by 
more subtle governmental interference."115 Disclosure of affilia-
tion with a group engaged in advocacy, like the NAACP, could 
constitute an effective restraint of freedom of association. "On this 
record it sufficiently appears that compulsory disclosure of the 
membership lists of the local branches of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People would work a significant 
interference with the freedom of association of their members."116 
The holding that the ordinance thus restricts a first amendment 
right does not, however, of itself wholly resolve the case. Only 
under an absolutist view of the first amendment would that be 
true.11 7 To a Court which, in the main, rejects that view, a balanc-
ing of the interests involved is required. Justice Stewart, who de-
livered the Bates opinion, stated, "Decision in this case must 
finally turn, therefore, on whether the cities as instrumentalities of 
the State have demonstrated so cogent an interest in obtaining 
and making public the membership lists of these organizations as 
to justify the substantial abridgment of associational freedom which 
such disclosures will effect. Where there is a significant encroach-
ment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon show-
ing a subordinating interest which is compelling. "118 In the instant 
case, no such showing is made. On the contrary, here there is no 
"relevant correlation between the power of the municipalities to 
impose occupation license taxes and the compulsory disclosure and 
publication of the membership lists of the local branches of the" 
NAACP.119 Consequently, the municipality had failed to demon-
strate a controlling justification for the deterrence of free as-
sociation which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists 
would cause. 
115 Id. at 523. 
116 Id. at 523-24. 
117 Such view is expressly taken by Justices Black and Douglas, concurring, id, at 
527-28. 
118 Id. at 524. 
119 Id. at 525. 
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VII. THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION 
One who yearly analyzes the work of the highest tribunal well 
realizes the truth in Cardozo's famous statement that the law has its 
periods of ebbs and flow. Certainly, it will hardly be contended 
that the 1959 Term constituted one of the flood tides of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. Indeed, compared to some of the more 
recent terms of the Warren Court, the one under review may 
seem relatively inconsequential. 
Yet, even "ordinary" terms of the high bench are not without 
significance to students of the Court as an institution. If anything, 
in fact, such terms may be of even greater value from the point of 
view of day-to-day institutional functioning. Great cases, like 
hard cases, are prone to make bad law.12° Cases decided in the 
glare of the cause celebre are far more apt to distort the functioning 
. of the deciding tribunal than those dealt with under calmer cir-
cumstances. 
In a Court divided, as it is, between two polar extremes, how-
ever, even the seemingly run-of-the-mill case may lead to articu-
lation of the sharpest differences, and even to expressions of 
acerbity among the Justices. The division between the rival 
judicial philosophies of Justices Frankfurter and Black, which has 
been the outstanding characteristic of the Court in recent years, 
has continued. And, as has been true of the terms since 1956, it 
has been the Frankfurter approach that has continued to command 
the allegiance of a majority of the Justices. 
Wholly apart from the merits upon which the basic division in 
the Court is grounded, the most distressing aspect of such division 
is its constant articulation by the Justices concerned. Thus, 
Justice Black continues to seize every occasion to repeat his pre-
ferred-position philosophy on the first amendment. While, on his 
side, Justice Frankfurter does the same to reiterate his view on the 
same matter. It is rare for either to concur silently in a decision 
involving any of the points on which there is fundamental disagree-
ment between them. The result, of course, is that it is all but 
impossible to obtain a single opinion of the Court-or even a single 
dissent-in cases involving such points. 
One wonders whether the best way to win acceptance of 
judicial doctrine is to thrust such doctrine into every case where it 
may conceivably be involved. It may be doubted, on the contrary, 
120 Compare Justice Douglas dissenting in United Steelworkers v. United States. 361 
U.S. 39, 62 (1959). 
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whether the constant proliferation of dissents and concurrences, 
which are only variations on the same theme, actually accomplish 
the purpose intended by their authors. 
A dissent or concurrence, to paraphrase Chief Justice Hughes, 
is an appeal to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision 
may possibly adopt the reasoning urged.121 Such appeals can 
surely be made more effectively by judges who have not exercised 
overfreely their right of speaking to the future. Thus, the most 
effective dissents are surely not those rendered by Justices who have 
established a reputation for disagreeing with their colleagues. 
In the immediate future the Court will continue to be divided 
along its present lines, even when the two principal polar figures 
themselves no longer actively participate. And, rash though it 
may be to attempt to predict, there is no reason to assume any real 
upset in the present posture in the Court. If anything, in fact, the 
Black approach should suffer the more severe blow when its chief 
exponent is no longer on the bench. For, far more than the school 
of self-restraint, it depends for its effectiveness on the personal 
forcefulness of those who articulate it. 
In the long run it is hard to see how a high Court in a demo-
cratic society can long be activist in the Black sense. This is 
true regardless of the personnel that may compose such Court. In 
a system such as ours, it is the political branches, not the judiciary 
that must be endowed with the primacy. For the Court to assert 
the degree of power demanded by the activist philosophy would be 
for it to deflect responsibility from those on whom it must ulti-
mately rest in a democratic society-the people. In Marshall's apt 
language, "The people made the Constitution and the people can 
unmake it. It is the creature of their wills and lives only by their 
will."122 Even in our system, the Constitution is what the judges 
say it is only if ultimately the judges say what most of the people 
want them to say.128 
121 HUGHF.S, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.5 68 (1928). 
122 Quoted 309 U.S. xv (1940). 
128 Peltason, The National Courts, the Federal System, and the States' Rights, in 
PRESENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 184 Gunz ed. 1960). 
